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THE CENTER HOLDS, BUT WHERE IS THE CENTER?
A RESPONSE TO JAMES SIMON
STEVEN R. SHAPIRO*

James Simon's exploration of "the power struggle inside the Rehnquist
Court"' provides an intriguing glimpse of the Court's internal
deliberations. Its behind-the-scene stories are irresistible to Supreme
Court watchers, myself included. The story of Justice Brennan wiggling
his fingers in the air as he told each new generation of law clerks that
"[f]ive votes can do anything around here"2 explains, in a single phrase,
both Justice Brennan's personal charm and his remarkable success as a
savvy courthouse politician who, especially during the last decade of his
career, was able to fashion liberal majorities on a conservative court by
stitching together increasingly incongruous coalitions.
Just as Justice Brennan's charm served a larger political purpose, each
anecdote in Jim Simon's book also serves a larger purpose. Simon freely
concedes that he began his research expecting to write about a right wing
judicial counterrevolution and ended by concluding that the
counterrevolution never occurred.3 Within limits, I share that conclusion.
However, the limits are important. I am reminded of the famous
exchange between Louis XVI and the Duc de la Rochefoucauld. Upon
hearing that the Bastille had fallen, the King turned to Rochefoucauld and
asked: "Is it a revolt?" "No," the Duke supposedly replied, "it is a
revolution." Here, the opposite is true. The Rehnquist Court may not
have achieved the counterrevolution that its chief justice had hoped to
achieve. But I fear that it has engaged in more of a revolt than Jim Simon
admits.
I should begin with a few disclaimers. Since 1987, I have supervised
the work of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) in the Supreme
Court. I have been personally involved, therefore, with many of the cases
discussed in The CenterHolds: The Power Struggle Inside The Rehnquist
Court. Several were direct ACLU cases and the ACLU submitted amicus
* Legal Director, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation.
1. JAMES F. SIMON, THE CENTER HOLDS: THE POWER STRUGGLE INSIDE THE
REHNQUIST COURT (1995) [hereinafter THE CENTER HOLDS].

2. Id. at 54.
3. James Simon originally set out to write a book about what he thought would be
a "successful conservative judicial revolution." See James F. Simon, Politics and the
Rehnquist Court, delivered as the Sixth Annual Solomon Lecture at New York Law
School (Oct. 31, 1995) in 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 863 (1996). Instead, The Center
Holds turned out to be "the story of a conservative judicial revolution that failed." THE
CENTER HOLDS, supra note 1, at 11.
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curiae briefs in most of the others. We won more cases than we lost
during those years. Nevertheless, every lawyer has a tendency to describe
any loss as an abandonment of principle by judges intent on turning back
the clock. In short, I am a close observer of the Supreme Court but not
a dispassionate one. In addition, Jim Simon was kind enough to ask me
to read an early draft of his First Amendment chapter and even kinder to
mention me in his acknowledgements. My public comments are offered
in the same constructive spirit as my earlier, private comments and with
even greater admiration for the finished product and the accomplishment
it represents.
One of my duties at the ACLU is to prepare a summary at the end of
each Supreme Court term of the year's important civil liberties decisions.
In preparation for writing this piece, I went back and reviewed those
summaries, beginning with the October 1988 term. As Jim Simon
reminds us in his Solomon lecture, 4 the headline in The New York Times
that year read, "The Year the Court Turned Right." 5 My summary of the
term struck a similar tone. At the end of the October 1994 term, most of
the commentary again focused on the Court's rightward drift. Largely
because of the Court's decisions on race, to which I will return later, I
described the term as a major setback for civil liberties. I continue to
believe that description was apt.
Between 1988 and 1994, the picture was murkier. During the
October 1991 term, the Supreme Court refused to overturn Roe v. Wade6
4. Simon, supra note 3, at 865.
5. Linda Greenhouse, The Year the Court Turned Right, N.Y. TIMEs, July 7, 1989,
at Al.
6. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1992)
("After considering the fundamental constitutional questions resolved by Roe, principles
of institutional integrity, and the rule of stare decisis, we are led to conclude this: the
essential holding of Roe v. Wade should be retained and once again reaffirmed.").
In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court struck down a Texas statute that made abortion
a crime except when necessary to save the life of the mother. 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973).
Recognizing a woman's fundamental right to control her own child-bearing decisions, the
Roe Court held: (1) the decision to perform an abortion remains with a woman and her
physician for the first trimester of the woman's pregnancy; (2) the state may regulate
abortions in manners reasonably related to the mother's health for the stage "subsequent
to approximately the end of the first trimester"; and (3) once the fetus is viable, the state
may regulate or proscribe abortions unless an abortion is necessary "for the preservation
of the life or health of the mother." Id. Although Casey retained "the essential holding
of Roe," it replaced Roe's trimester analysis with an "undue burden" standard that is
designed to be more sympathetic to government regulatory efforts. Casey, 505 U.S. at
846, 876; see infra note 37.
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and refused to condone prayer at a high school commencement. 7 The
Court's 5-4 decisions in PlannedParenthoodof Southeastern Pennsylvania
v. Casey' and Lee v. Weisman9 were hailed by many as signalling the
emergence of a moderate middle consisting of Justices O'Connor, Souter,
and Kennedy. These three justices were linked together primarily on the
strength of their remarkable joint opinion in Casey"° and the fact that
they voted together in Weisman. I
By the following year, however, it was difficult to find anyone still
referring to these three justices as a voting bloc. Since then, Justice
Souter has been increasingly characterized as a member of the Court's
liberal wing and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy have vied for the title of
the Court's most influential justice in end-of-the-year analyses. Those
who favor anointing Justice Kennedy with the title correctly note that he
is rarely on the losing side in 5-4 cases. Those who believe that Justice
O'Connor is the Court's pivotal fifth vote note, also correctly, that the
Court's reliance on the undue burden test in abortion cases,' 2 the
endorsement test in Establishment Clause cases, 3 and the use of strict
scrutiny in affirmative action 4 and redistricting cases,' 5 all reflect
Justice O'Connor's influence.
What is one to make of all this? One lesson surely is that Supreme
Court watching, like Kremlin watching, is endlessly fascinating but
notoriously unreliable. This is not because any of the observations noted
above is incorrect. Rather, it is because the Supreme Court is far too
complex a body to be captured by a single phrase embodied in a single
year's headline (or book title). Indeed, even the well-ingrained habit of
defining Supreme Court eras by the identity of the chief justice is
inherently misleading. We speak, for example, of the "Rehnquist Court."
7. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 597-98 (1992). This case involved the use

of invocation and benediction prayers at formal school graduation ceremonies. Id. at
580. The Court held that such activity violated the Establishment Clause of the United
States Constitution. Id. at 598.
8. 505 U.S. 833.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

505 U.S. 577.
505 U.S. at 843-901.
505 U.S. at 579-99.
See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 879, 880, 887, 895.
See, e.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 115 S.Ct. 2440,

2447 (1995).
14. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 2117 (1995);
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-95 (1989).
15. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475,2490 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 113
S. Ct. 2816, 2830 (1993).
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But five of the eight justices who were on the Court when Rehnquist was
elevated to the position of chief justice have since retired. Among other
changes, Thurgood Marshall has been replaced by Clarence Thomas and
Byron White has been replaced by Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Both in terms
of personnel and doctrine, the Court is constantly evolving.
One consequence of this evolution is that it makes it more difficult to
define where the center lies and what the appropriate reference points
should be. By entitling his book The CenterHolds, Jim Simon appears to
be speaking in terms of the Court's current personnel. By that definition,
it is fair to say that Justices O'Connor and Kennedy occupy the Court's
ideological middle. But it is equally clear that the Court's ideological
middle has shifted to the right since the retirement of Justices Brennan,
Marshall and Blackmun (and shifted even more if one goes back to include
Justice Douglas, whose tenure on the Court overlapped with Justice
Rehnquist for three years). Alternatively, the center of the Court can be
defined in relation to the nation's current political mood. But, there too,
there is little doubt that the nation's political mood has also grown more
conservative in recent years.
This poses a central dilemma for Jim Simon's thesis. Because the
center of any spectrum necessarily moves as the spectrum moves, he and
his critics may both be correct. That is to say, the center of the Court has
held by one definition and moved to the right by another. The ongoing
debate over "welfare reform" illustrates the same problem in another
context. Proposals that are now described as middle of the road would
have been viewed as extreme only a short time ago. Has the center held
if aid to dependent children is no longer seen as an entitlement but unwed
mothers are spared some of the punitive sanctions that have been recently
suggested? It is, as they say, all a matter of perspective and perspective
inevitably changes depending on where one stands.
In the end, therefore, characterizing the Court as centrist or extremist
is less useful than describing what the Court has and has not done. Jim
Simon has chosen to focus on what the Court has not done, and that is fair
enough. The opening section of his book describes Chief Justice
Rehnquist's unsuccessful effort in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union 6
to overrule Runyon v. McCrary, 7 an important 1976 decision that
permitted federal court suits against private employers for racial
16. 491 U.S. 164, 171-75, 179-80 (1989) (refusing to overrule Runyon v. McCrary

and holding that racial harassment relating to employment conditions is not actionable
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981), discussed in THE CENTER HOLDS, supra note 1, at 19-61.
17. 427 U.S. 160, 170-71 (1976) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 prohibits racial
discrimination in the making and enforcement of private contracts), discussed in THE
CENTER HOLDS, supra note 1, at 19-61.
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discrimination in the making of contracts.'" That defeat was a significant
one for the Chief Justice. Even more significantly, there was broad
speculation after Ronald Reagan's election that a transformed Supreme
Court would eliminate the exclusionary rule, reinstitute school prayer, and
reverse Roe v. Wade.' None of those things has happened, and none is
likely to happen in the near future.
What the Rehnquist Court has done is disturbing enough, however,
even if it has fallen short of the judicial counterrevolution that its
conservative sponsors had sought and expected. Race is a useful place to
begin, as it so often is in American life. From Dred Scott v. Sandford'"
to Plessy v. Ferguson- to Brown v. Board of Education,'2 no issue has
done more to define the role of the Supreme Court in our constitutional
system.
Where does the Rehnquist Court stand on issues of race? First, it has
led the retreat on affirmative action by holding that programs designed to
remedy discrimination must be judged by the same strict scrutiny applied
Second, it has
to programs designed to perpetuate discrimination.3
critically wounded the Voting Rights Act-probably the most successful
piece of civil rights legislation enacted in this century-by holding that
white voters have standing to challenge the constitutionality of redistricting
plans drawn to insure minority representation even in the absence of any
allegation that white voting strength has been diluted.24 As a result,
virtually every congressional district in the South represented by a
minority is now being challenged in court. Third, it has signaled its
eagerness to get out of the school desegregation business by holding, with
increasing regularity, that the states can no longer be held responsible for
the ongoing problems of school segregation. ' Fourth, it has chosen to
18. See THE CENTER HOLDS, supra note 1, at 19-61.
19. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
20. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856) (holding that a slave was the property of his
owner and thus did not have the right to sue for his freedom as a citizen even when
brought by his owner into a slave-free state).
21. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
22. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
23. See Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995); City of Richmond
v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
24. See Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816

(1993).
25. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 518 S. Ct. 2038 (1995) (holding that district
court exceeded the scope of its remedial authority by designing order intended to lure
white children from the suburbs back into the Kansas City school system); Freeman v.
Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 491 (1992) (holding that "upon a finding that a school system
subject to a court-supervised desegregation plan is in compliance in some but not all
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ignore blatant evidence of racial discrimination in the criminal justice
system by upholding the constitutionality of the death penalty despite
irrefutable proof that defendants are much more likely to be sentenced to
die if their victims are white than if their victims are black.' Fifth, it
has consistently adopted the narrowest possible interpretation of civil
rights legislation, making it more difficult to prove discrimination in a
variety of contexts.2 7 Twice within the past decade, Congress has
responded by enacting "Civil Rights Restoration Acts" intended to restore

the status quo.'

The unifying theme in all of these cases is that this is

a Court that seems more concerned with racial neutrality than racial

equality.

The appearance of fairness becomes more important than

fairness itself.

It is no doubt true, as Jim Simon reminds us in his Solomon lecture,
that the results in all of these cases could have been worse if the center

had not "held." Justice Scalia's position, for instance, is that affirmative
action programs are never a justifiable response to past discrimination and

thus can never survive strict scrutiny.29 Justice O'Connor has not been

willing to go that far. She has insisted on strict scrutiny but has insisted,
as well, that strict scrutiny need not be "'fatal in fact.'"3
Thus,
presumably, there is a subset of affirmative action cases that Justice Scalia
would strike down but that Justice O'Connor would uphold under strict

scrutiny. What is not known is how many cases will fit into that category.
areas, the court in appropriate cases may return control to the school system in those
areas where compliance has been achieved"); Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237,
250 (1991) (holding that school desegregation orders should be dissolved if school district
has taken all "practicable" steps to eliminate legacy of segregation, even if segregation
remains).
26. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286-91 (1987).
27. See, e.g., Landgrafv. USI Film Prods., 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1505, 1508 (1994)
(holding that the statute authorizing compensatory and punitive damages in Title VII
actions does not apply retroactively); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642,
657 (1989) (stating that in a Title VII claim, the plaintiff must identify a specific
employment practice that caused a disparate impact); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,
491 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1989) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 only bars discrimination
in the making of a contract, not discrimination in the terms and conditions of continued
employment which is covered by Title VII).
28. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (rejecting
the rationale of six Supreme Court decisions); Civil Rights Resforation Act of 1987, Pub.
L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988) (rejecting the limited application of Title IX in
Grove City v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984)).
29. See Adarand Constructors, 115 S. Ct. at 2118-19 (Scalia, J., concurring).
30. Id. at 2117 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980)
(Marshall, J. concurring)).
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One may get some insight into the answer to that question by looking
at two other areas where Justice O'Connor's "centrist" position has
become Supreme Court doctrine. In Establishment Clause cases, the
Court has come to rely more and more on Justice O'Connor's
endorsement test. 31 Under that test, the government may not engage in
any action that a reasonable person would regard as an endorsement of
religion.2 The key, of course, is how one measures "endorsement." In
the October 1994 term, Justice O'Connor provided the fifth vote in favor
of government funding for a religious student publication at the University
of Virginia.33 In typical fashion, Justice O'Connor tried to narrow the
scope of the majority holding by writing a separate concurring opinion that
may or may not prove significant in future cases.' Yet the fact remains,
as the dissent pointed out, that this was the first time that the Supreme
Court had ever upheld direct government funding for a religious
activity.35
Similarly, Justice O'Connor has steadfastly refused to overturn Roe
v. Wade and gradually convinced the Court to adopt the undue burden test
that she has championed for years.36 The refusal to overrule Roe is an
important victory and I do not intend to underestimate its significance,
either legally or politically. But it would be equally wrong to ignore the
fact that the undue burden test has enabled the Court to sustain a whole
series of abortion regulations that had been struck down when Roe was
applied in its undiluted form.37 This diluted version of Roe can only be
described as "centrist" if Roe itself is described as extreme.
More generally, the Rehnquist Court can be described as moderate
only if whittling away at constitutional doctrine, rather than whacking
away, can be described as a centrist response in these political times. It
31. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); Board of Educ. of Westside
Community Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38
(1985); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
32. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
33. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 115 S.Ct. 2510, 2525-28

(1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
34. Id.

35. Id. at 2533 (5-4 decision) (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Justices Stevens,
Ginsburg and Breyer).
36. See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 530 (1989)

(O'Connor, J., concurring).
37. Compare Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833

(1992) (upholding statute requiring physician to inform pregnant woman of the health
risks associated with abortion and childbirth, as well as the probable gestational age of
the fetus), with Thornburghv. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747 (1986) (striking down a similar ordinance).
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is fashionable nowadays to say that big government has to shrink. The
Court seems to take the same approach to its role in protecting
constitutional rights. Every other Court since the New Deal has expanded
our vision of constitutional liberty. It was, for example, the Burger
Court, not the Warren Court, that applied heightened scrutiny to gender

discrimination to claims under the Fourteenth Amendment,3 8 and decided
Roe. What constitutional rights have the Rehnquist Court championed?
Two come to mind. First, and most prominently, the present Court has
breathed new life into the Takings Clause.39 Second, it has vigorously
supported the rights of commercial speakers.' This is not the place to
debate the merits of those developments. But in attempting to place the
Rehnquist Court in context it is important to note that the moral passion
that previous Courts reserved for individual rights has been most often
expressed by the Rehnquist Court on behalf of property rights.
Finally, it would be a mistake to ignore two cases from last year that
may turn out to be idiosyncratic or, alternatively, may signal the beginning
of a new and truly conservative revolution on the Court. In United States
v. Lopez,4 a 5-4 majority ruled that Congress had exceeded its
constitutional authority by attempting to ban all guns within 1000 feet of
38. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) ("[tlo withstand constitutional
challenge... classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and
must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives."); see also Mississippi
Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982).
39. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994) (holding that
requiring a private property owner to dedicate land to a public rather than private
greenway is not rationally related to the city's interest in flood control); Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (stating that a state cannot merely
declare that an owner's proposed use of private land is inconsistent with the public
interest, but that it must identify principles in law to prohibit that proposed use); Nollan
v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (holding that the government can
only forbid particular land use in order to advance a legitimate police power including
a concession of property rights, "so long as the condition furthers the same governmental
purpose advanced as justification for prohibiting the use").
40. See, e.g., Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585 (1995) (stating that a
ban on allowing alcohol content to be printed on beer labels was a violation of First
Amendment protection of commercial speech because the ban did not advance the
government's interest in suppressing the "strength wars" in a direct and material way);
Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993) (holding that a ban on in-person solicitations by
CPAs failed to advance the government's substantial interest in protecting consumers
from fraud and overreaching by CPAs and therefore violated the First Amendment); City
of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993) (holding that a city
regulation of newsracks was invalid because it was predicated on the content of the
publications being restricted and those that were not, and therefore violated the First
Amendment).
41. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
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any public, private, or parochial school. It was the first time since 1936
that a federal statute had been ruled invalid under the Commerce
Clause.4 2 In United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,43 the Court
ruled that states could not alter the "qualifications" for congressional
officeholders by imposing term limits.'
That ruling was expected.
What was not expected was the close 5-4 vote or Justice Thomas'
dissenting opinion, which questioned the very premises of the federal
union and the notion of national citizenship.4'
Taken together, Lopez and Thornton have led some to conclude that
the issue of states' rights will once again become a significant one for the
Court. If so, many of the Court's civil rights decisions may be in
jeopardy. I do not expect that to happen. I believe this is a Court that
has too much allegiance to stare decisis to permit such a precipitous shift
in the Court's constitutional jurisprudence.' On this issue, I agree that
the center will hold. But as long as the center keeps moving to the right,
I take less comfort in that fact than some others might.

42. See generally Charles B. Schweitzer, Street Crime, Interstate Commerce, and
the FederalDocket: The Impact of United States v. Lopez, 34 DUQ. L. REv. 71 (1995)
(discussing Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936)).
43. 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995).
44. Id. at 1871.
45. Id. at 1875.
46. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 868 ("The promise of constancy, once given,
binds its maker for as long as the power to stand by the decision survives and the

understanding of the issue has not changed so fundamentally as to render the commitment
obsolete.").

